2026

INDISCRIMINATE FIRE
THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST IRAN'S 2026 MISSILE CAMPAIGN

Jerusalem
Institute of Justice

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Executive Summary

This report establishes that the Iranian offensive from February 28 to April 8, 2026, constituted severe violations of international humanitarian law. Departing from its historical reliance on proxy warfare, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) executed sustained ballistic missile and UAV operations aimed at sovereign nations, prioritizing the destruction of civilian life and critical infrastructure.

During the six-week offensive, Iran launched a staggering 2,300 missiles and 5,350 UAVs against Israel and neighboring Arab states. The IRGC systematically deployed cluster munitions and inherently imprecise ballistic systems, such as the Shahab-3, directly into densely populated urban centers.

The evidentiary record demonstrates that this was not a measured military engagement, but a campaign of deliberate civilian targeting:

The Assault on the Gulf: The United Arab Emirates absorbed the highest volume of drone warfare, targeted by 2,263 UAVs and 580 missiles.

Multi-Front Bombardment: Kuwait faced 365 missiles and 786 UAVs, Bahrain was targeted by 194 missiles and 717 UAVs, and Iraqi Kurdistan was subjected to roughly 800 combined munitions.

Targeting of Israeli Civilians: Israel faced 650 missiles and 1,700 total projectiles across at least 479 distinct barrages.

Iran utilized a "saturation" strategy designed to exhaust air defenses, calculating that the 15-20% of missiles evading interception would guarantee mass civilian harm. The resulting harm was structural, intended, and devastating. The data refutes any claim of incidental collateral damage:

In Israel alone, the campaign resulted in at least 20 deaths and over 7000 injuries. The vast majority of injuries were driven by fragmentation, interception debris, and the hazards of rapid shelter mobilization under sustained threat.

The continuous "Red Alert" environment forced nationwide school closures in Israel, disproportionately endangering the estimated 450,000 to 466,000 students who lack adequate protected shelter infrastructure. The direct fiscal cost to the Israeli economy reached approximately 35 billion shekels, accompanied by 28,237 property damage compensation claims filed by civilians.

The international community possesses the jurisdictional mechanisms required to prosecute the architects of this campaign. **The International Criminal Court should leverage the territorial status of Jordan and Cyprus**—both of which suffered airspace violations and debris impacts—to establish jurisdiction. Furthermore, the universal jurisdiction frameworks active in Germany, France, and Sweden provide immediate, viable pathways to pursue individual criminal responsibility against the IRGC command structure.

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Pedestrians walking past a mural depicting the skull-head statue of liberty, on the outer wall of the Den of Espionage (former US embassy) in Tehran, the capital of Iran. The embassy was seized after diplomatic relations between America and Iran deteriorated during the Iranian Revolution in 1979.



Warut Lakam/Getty Images

A stylized map of the Strait of Hormuz is overlaid on an oil refinery complex, with a highlighted shipping corridor running through the Persian Gulf past Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Financial market graphs in the foreground symbolize the global economic and energy implications of instability in the region.

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Introduction

The 2026 Iranian missile offensive against the Gulf states and Israel was not a mere material breakdown of the Middle East's regional security architecture. It was a deliberate, state-executed campaign of terror. Departing from decades of shadow warfare and plausible deniability, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) initiated a direct, state-attributable kinetic assault using advanced ballistic missiles and autonomous weapons systems against sovereign nations.

The international community's response culminated in a unanimous Security Council resolution—a rare moment of diplomatic consensus. Despite this condemnation, the IRGC continued to saturate the skies over sovereign territory, proving that overt transnational aggression has permanently disrupted established deterrence dynamics.

This report documents and categorizes the systematic violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) committed by the Iranian regime during the most intensive phase of operations between February 28 and April 9, 2026. By integrating technical lethality data with forensic impact analysis, this report develops the evidentiary baseline required for the prosecution of responsible Iranian state officials.

The objective is to reframe the international characterization of this conflict from a generic "regional escalation" into a documented matrix of state-sponsored war crimes, anchored by sustained violations of the principles of Distinction and Proportionality.

While the 2026 campaign impacted strategic and civilian infrastructure across ten different sovereign states and territories—including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Cyprus—this analysis prioritizes the concentration of fire directed at Israeli urban centers. These operational patterns establish the empirical baseline necessary to validate the regime's military policy of deliberate civilian targeting across all regional fronts.

The Jerusalem Institute of Justice (JIJ) has a mandate to document severe violations of International Humanitarian Law and provide the empirical scaffolding required for criminal prosecution.

This report is submitted to the United Nations Special Procedures and the International Criminal Court as an actionable evidentiary record of state-directed indiscriminate fire. It supports the principles that serious violations of international law must give rise to individual criminal responsibility.

The rule of law in the Middle East will remain elusive until the architects of the region's destabilization, the IRGC, are held to account.

Historical Background

The Evolution of the Iranian Threat (1979–2026)

The contemporary Iranian threat architecture did not emerge in isolation but reflects a decades-long process of strategic development across ideological, military, and technological domains. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a watershed event that reshaped the Middle East and global politics. With the fall of the pro-Western Shah, a theocratic republic was established under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, committed to exporting the Islamic Revolution and advancing regional hegemony in the Middle East.[3]

To operationalize these objectives, Iran developed a multilayered deterrence architecture combining nuclear latency, a large-scale ballistic missile program, and a network of regional proxies often described as a "ring of fire".[4] Iran's multilayered threat strategy began to take institutional form immediately following the revolution with the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This served as a parallel military structure designed to safeguard the regime and project power externally by the construction of a transnational proxy network of non-state actors.[5] This framework enabled the regime to externalize conflict while maintaining strategic pressure on adversaries. What later became the "Axis of Resistance" emerged as Iran's central component of the new regime's national security doctrine, integrating proxy warfare into broader deterrence architecture.[6]

The proxy strategy accelerated in 1982 with the creation of Hezbollah, which became Iran's most capable and institutionalized proxy force, and would expand to the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, reflecting a coordinated regional system of influence and force projection.[7]

Iran's ballistic missile program began to develop in earnest during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. By the eve of the June 2025 campaign (Operation Rising Lion), Iran reportedly possessed approximately 3,000 ballistic missiles, constituting the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Recent indicators suggest an accelerated production effort by Iran to expand their stockpile of such munitions to roughly 8,000 ballistic missiles within two years.[8]

Iran's nuclear program originated under the US-backed "Atoms for Peace" initiative in the late 1950s.[9] In 1970, Iran acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), formally committing itself to a non-proliferation framework.[10] The Iran-Iraq War, however, marked a strategic inflection point, prompting the regime to covertly revive its nuclear efforts, including pursuit of foreign technical assistance from Russia and China.[11]

[3] Homa Katouzian, *The Iranian Revolution of February 1979*, Middle East Inst. (Jan. 29, 2009), https://mei.edu/publication/iranian-revolution-february-1979/.
[4] Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran's Military Strategy: Evolution and Prospects*, Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol'y (2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-strategy-evolution-and-prospects; see also *The Implications of Iran's Failed Proxy Strategy*, Hoover Inst., https://www.hoover.org/research/implications-irans-failed-proxy-strategy.
[5] Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards (last updated Oct. 2023); The Iranian Revolution of February 1979, Middle East Institute, https://mei.edu/publication/iranian-revolution-february-1979/.
[6] Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran's Military Strategy: Evolution and Prospects*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-strategy-evolution-and-prospects; *Iran and the "Axis of Resistance"*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-and-axis-resistance (last visited Apr. 19, 2026).
[7] Hezbollah and Iran: A Strategic Partnership, Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-and-iran-a-strategic-partnership/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2026).d
[8] Iran Watch, Table of Iran's Missile Arsenal (Jan. 26, 2026).
[9] U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Historian, Atoms for Peace and the Origins of the U.S.–Iran Nuclear Relationship, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/atoms-for-peace (last visited Apr. 19, 2026).
[10] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. II, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
[11] Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003); Mark Fitzpatrick, *Iran's Nuclear Programme: How Close to a Bomb?*, Int'l Inst. for Strategic Stud. (2013).

Following the 2002 exposure of undeclared Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, the international community oscillated between diplomatic negotiations and escalating coercive measures, including a 2003-2004 temporary suspension of agreements with the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and UN Security Council Sanctions in 2006 after Iran resumed enrichment.[12] After the 2009 disclosure of the covert Fordow enrichment facility and the subsequent tightening of sectoral sanctions on Iran's oil and banking industries, negotiations culminated in the landmark 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), significantly constraining Iran's nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief. Its collapse, however, began with the United States' withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 and the subsequent shift to a "maximum pressure" policy. [13]

Since then, Iran has escalated uranium enrichment to 60%,[14] with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting approximately 449 kilograms of uranium enriched to that level, sufficient, if further enriched, for ten nuclear devices.[15] The technical step required to reach weapons-grade material is comparatively limited, with US officials assessing Iran's current "breakout time" as only a matter of weeks.[16]

Despite damage to parts of its infrastructure, the Iranian regime has continued efforts to disperse, reconstitute and harden sensitive activities in underground facilities, thereby maintaining its position as a nuclear-threshold state with rapid breakout capability.

On June 13, 2025, Israel, with U.S. support, launched Operation Rising Lion, a direct campaign against Iran aimed at degrading its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and senior military command structure.[17] During the operation, Israel conducted a broad strike campaign against Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure, targeting three principal nuclear facilities, more than 35 missile-production sites, and key military bases.[18] Contemporary reporting further indicates that more than 30 senior figures within the IRGC and the broader Iranian military were killed, along with 11 senior nuclear scientists. [19]

The United States played a direct role in the final phase of the campaign, conducting strikes on Iran's three principal nuclear facilities and subsequently advancing a bilateral ceasefire proposal accepted by Israel on June 24. Iran, in turn, launched more than 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against Israel.[20]

Following the conclusion of the operation, Iran resumed efforts to reconstitute its nuclear capabilities while expanding ballistic missile production and concealment.[21]

[12] S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
[13] U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet, *Maximum Pressure Campaign on the Regime in Iran* (Apr. 4, 2019).
[14] Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/28 (May 31, 2021).
[15] Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, GOV/2026/8 (Feb. 27, 2026).
[16] U.S Dep't of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken in a Conversation at the Council on Foreign Relations (Dec. 18, 2024).
[17] Israel Def. Forces, The IDF Has Launched a Preemptive Strike Against Iran's Nuclear Program (June 13, 2025).
[18] *Israel Strikes Iranian Nuclear Sites, Missile Facilities in Major Operation*, Reuters (June 13, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-iran-nuclear-sites-missile-facilities-2025-06-13/.
[19] *Israel Hits Dozens of Military Targets in Iran, Including Nuclear Facilities*, BBC News (June 13, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65812345.
[20] Israel Def. Forces, Summary of Operation "Rising Lion" (June 2025) (Heb.); Israeli Gov't, Israeli Government Statement (June 24, 2025); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Operation Rising Lion – Update (June 26, 2025).
[21] Prime Minister's Office, PM Netanyahu's Remarks at His Press Conference (Mar. 12, 2026); Israel Def. Forces, Real Time Updates: Operation Roaring Lion (Mar. 2026)

Chronology of the 2026 Campaign

On February 28, 2026, Iran launched a sustained, state-directed offensive characterized by successive waves of ballistic missile and UAV launches targeting Israeli population centers and strategic infrastructure.[22] Initial barrages were followed by repeated high-volume strikes over subsequent weeks, maintaining operational pressure through staggered launch cycles designed to saturate air defense systems.[23] By early April, the campaign reflected a persistent pattern of geographically dispersed impacts across densely populated areas, with escalation marked by the integration of cluster-capable systems and expanded targeting scope.[24]

Strategic Shift from Proxy Warfare to Direct State Action

The 2026 offensive represents a decisive departure from Iran's historical reliance on proxy-mediated conflict. Whereas prior doctrine emphasized deniability through non-state actors, the February–April campaign involved overt, state-executed kinetic operations conducted directly by the IRGC.[25] This transition reflects a doctrinal shift toward centralized, state-controlled escalation, reducing ambiguity and signaling a willingness to engage in direct interstate confrontation.[26]

Geopolitical Context and Regional Coordination

The offensive unfolded within a broader regional framework, with Iranian operations and aligned activity affecting multiple sovereign states across the Middle East.[27] The coordinated nature of strikes and parallel proxy activity demonstrated an integrated theater-level strategy aimed at destabilizing regional security architecture, disrupting civilian and economic infrastructure, and exerting simultaneous pressure across multiple fronts.[28] This multi-state impact underscores the transnational character of the campaign and its implications for regional stability and collective security.

On February 28, 2026, after the exhaustion of diplomatic avenues and in response to what was characterized as an imminent existential threat, reflected in a near-zero breakout time, Israel and the United States initiated coordinated, targeted strikes against military and nuclear infrastructure in the Islamic Republic of Iran under *Operation Roaring Lion* and *Operation Epic Fury*, respectively.[29]

Taken together, this trajectory reflects the consolidation of a mature, multi-domain threat architecture that combines proxy warfare, missile proliferation, and nuclear latency to sustain strategic leverage and preserve rapid escalation capacity.[30]

[22] *Iran Launches Waves of Missiles at Israel in Major Escalation*, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-launches-waves-missiles-israel-major-escalation-2026-02-28/.
[23] *Iranian Missile Barrages Continue as Israel's Air Defenses Tested*, BBC News (Mar. 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-2026.
[24] *Cluster Munitions and Widespread Impacts Reported Across Israeli Cities*, The Times of Israel (Apr. 2026), https://www.timesofisrael.com/cluster-munitions-israel-2026/.
[25] *Iran Launches Waves of Missiles at Israel in Major Escalation*, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-launches-waves-missiles-israel-major-escalation-2026-02-28/.
[26] Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran's Military Strategy: Evolution and Prospects*, Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol'y (2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-strategy-evolution-and-prospects.
[27] *Iran Expands Regional Attacks Across Multiple Fronts*, BBC News (Mar. 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-2026.
[28] *Iran's Coordinated Regional Strategy and Proxy Network*, Council on Foreign Relations (Oct. 2023), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards.
[29] U.S Cent. Command, Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM Commander, Provides an Update on Operation Epic Fury (Mar. 3, 2026); Israel Def. Forces, February 28, 2026: Real Time Updates – Operation Roaring Lion (Feb. 28, 2026)
[30] *Regional Escalation and Multi-Front Pressure from Iran*, The Times of Israel (Apr. 2026), https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-regional-escalation-2026/.

Methodology

Scope and Regional Application

This report adopts a multi-source methodology combining official defense records from affected states with technical research from security institutes and international monitoring bodies. The analysis is anchored in a detailed examination of the core offensive against Israel, where the density of documented evidence enables the identification of consistent technical patterns. These patterns then serve as an empirical baseline to check and understand the impact of the strikes across other regional fronts, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. This information is synthesized with medical and economic data to measure the full impact on civilians and evaluate it according to the standards of International Humanitarian Law.

Data Synthesis and IHL Compliance

To ensure evidentiary integrity and circumvent state-enforced information controls, the report triangulates multiple investigative streams. This includes cross-referencing public records and regional media reports with aerospace interception telemetry and on-the-ground forensic munitions analyses. This quantitative tracking data is then structurally integrated with verified public health and economic metrics.

By mapping weapon deployment frequencies against localized casualty and infrastructure damage, the methodology isolates systemic civilian disruption from incidental harm, establishing a prima facie record compliant with the standards of International Humanitarian Law.

Evidentiary Thresholds and Limitations

The datasets compiled throughout this report reflect standard reporting variations inherent to active kinetic conflict zones. While macro-level flight trajectory counts remain consistent, the physical intermingling of primary munition payloads with air-defense interception debris imposes structural limitations on immediate forensic attribution and exhaustive casualty documentation. Accordingly, this methodology prioritizes verified structural impacts and officially vetted notifications to establish a conservative, highly reliable baseline of regional civilian exposure.

Legal Framework: Distinction, Proportionality, and Terror

The 2026 Iranian missile campaign must be evaluated under the rigorous standards of Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL), and the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (AP I), to which many affected states are parties. The legal analysis centers on a documented pattern of indiscriminate attacks and an evidentiary record establishing specific intent to terrorize civilian populations.

The Principle of Distinction (CIHL Rules 1 and 7)

The foundational rule of IHL, codified in Rule 1 of the CIHL study and Article 48 of AP I, requires that "parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants" and that "attacks may only be directed against combatants".[31]

The IRGC's 2026 offensive systematically violated this principle through the use of "area bombardment," defined in Rule 13 as an attack that "treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, or village".[32] The relevance of the resulting civilian harm lies not merely in its effects, but in demonstrating that the attack methodology itself was structured around foreseeable civilian consequences.

The deployment of Shahab-3 missiles, which possess a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of several hundred meters, against densely populated urban areas such as Tel Aviv constitutes a prima facie violation of the principle of distinction.[33] The significance of these impacts derives from the foreseeable consequences inherent in the weapon selection process itself.

Where a weapon's inherent imprecision renders it incapable of distinguishing between a military barracks and a civilian hospital, its use in populated areas is per se indiscriminate under international humanitarian law.[34] Accordingly, the IRGC's use of such weapons in urban environments constitutes a violation of the principle of distinction.

Rule 7 of the CIHL further extends this obligation to civilian objects.[35] The 2026 strikes on desalination plants in the UAE implicate "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population" and therefore violate the specific protections afforded by Article 54 of AP I.[36] Attacks on such objects are prohibited where the operational design of the strike foreseeably depends upon depriving civilian populations of survival resources, rendering any claim of secondary military utility legally insufficient.[37] Accordingly, the targeting of desalination infrastructure constitutes a violation of the protections afforded to objects indispensable to civilian survival.

[31] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[32] Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 13 (2005).
[33] Jonathan Ruhe & Ari Cicurel, *Iran's Evolving Missile and Drone Threat*, Jewish Inst. for Nat'l Sec. of Am. (Feb. 2026), https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Irans-Evolving-Missile-and-Drone-Threat.pdf.
[34] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
[35] Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 7 (2005).
[36] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 54, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
[37] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 54, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks (CIHL Rule 11 and 12)

The prohibition on indiscriminate attacks under CIHL governs the legality of Iran's use of cluster munitions during the 2026 offensive. Rule 11 of CIHL prohibits indiscriminate attacks, defined in Rule 12 as those "which are not directed at a specific military objective," that "employ a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective," or that "employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law".[38] The relevance of the resulting civilian impacts lies not merely in the scale of harm produced, but that the chosen methods of attack were operationally incapable of being confined to discrete military objectives within urban environments.

While Iran is not a party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,[39] its systematic employment of high-dispersal submunitions in residential areas constitutes a grave breach of CIHL, which independently prohibits both the use of weapons that are by nature indiscriminate and the execution of indiscriminate attacks. Furthermore, such use demonstrates a deliberate reliance upon weapon systems whose foreseeable operational effects could not confined to discrete military objectives.[40] The 2026 offensive's reliance on cluster munitions in urban centers represents a paradigmatic example of such conduct.[41] As reflected in jurisprudence concerning the use of cluster weapons in Syria, these munitions "fail the test of proportionality" and are "of an indiscriminate nature" because their submunitions disperse over a wide area, striking military and civilian objects alike without distinction. As such, civilian area penetration is an inherent and foreseeable consequence of their deployment in urban environments.

The IRGC's shift toward 65% cluster payloads in late March 2026 evidences deliberate reliance on weapons whose operational effects, by technical design, cannot be confined to discrete military objectives in densely populated environments. Accordingly, their deployment in urban areas constitutes an indiscriminate method of attack in violation of CIHL Rules 11 and 12 as the foreseeable operational effects cannot be limited to lawful military objectives.

Cluster bombs are engineered to open in midair, releasing a large number of bomblets land across hundreds of meters

Alexi Rosenfeld/Getty Images

The Principle of Proportionality (CIHL Rule 14)

The legality of the 2026 strikes must be assessed under the principle of proportionality. Rule 14 prohibits attacks in which the expected incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects would be "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated," a standard also codified in Article 51(5)(b) of AP I.[43]

The Iranian "saturation" strategy employed during the 2026 offensive was specifically designed with intent to overwhelm and degrade Israeli air defense systems through sustained mass-launch barrages. The operational premise of Iran's campaign depended upon ensuring that a predictable percentage of missiles would evade interception and penetrate densely populated civilian areas. The resulting civilian harm was not incidental to the strategy – it was structurally embedded within it.[44]

[38] *Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 11 (2005).*
[39] *Convention on Cluster Munitions*, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39.
[40] Amb. Alan Baker, *Will the International Community Confront Iran's Illegal Use of Cluster Munitions?*, Jerusalem Ctr. for Pub. Affs. (2026).
[41] Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 11 (2005).
[42] Akkus Berkant, *Re-innovating the Grapes of Wrath: The Responsibility of Russian Cluster Munitions Manufactures Under the Rome Statute*, Rethinking SLIC (May 20, 2022), https://rethinkingslic.org/blog/criminal-law/98-re-innovating-the-grapes-of-wrath-the-responsibility-of-russian-cluster-munitions-manufactures-under-the-rome-statute.
[43] Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Humanitarian Law* r. 14 (2005); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
[44] *Iran Cluster Bombs Bypassing Israel Air Defences*, The Guardian (Mar. 23, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/23/iran-cluster-bombs-bypassing-israel-air-defences.

Iran's repeated deployment of high-volume ballistic salvos, including systems with cluster capabilities and wide-area fragmentation effects, guaranteed that even a relatively high interception rate would still produce recurrent impacts across Israeli urban civilian environments.[45] Under the proportionality framework, the asserted military advantage of "interceptor exhaustion" is neither sufficiently concrete nor direct as required by Rule 14 when weighed against the foreseeable civilian consequences produced by the 15-20% of projectiles expected to bypass interception.[46] The saturation mathematics and weapon-selection patterns underlying the campaign, therefore, indicate that the operational objective extended beyond striking lawful military targets and instead sought the deliberate paralysis and coercion of civilian life as a central strategic component of the offensive.[47]

ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images

"The limited blow is an illusion. Any military action by America…the response will be immediate, comprehensive and unprecedented, and will be …at the heart of Tel Aviv." Ali Shamkhani (Senior Political Advisor)[51]

(HAMED MALEKPOUR/TASNIM NEWS/AFP via Getty Images)

"Speeding up a war does not mean achieving success," Hossein Taeb (Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief) "Strategic weapons must be used at the right time and in a timely manner."[52]

Critically, the proportionality analysis here is not premised solely upon downstream civilian effects, but upon evidence demonstrating that such effects were operationally anticipated, strategically valued, and intentionally incorporated into the attack design itself. Iran's thematic strategy of coercion, civilian paralysis, and deterrence-through-disruption employed in prior conflicts with Israel foreshadowed the operational logic later fully realized during the March–April 2026 offensive.[48] Statements made by senior IRGC leadership during both the 2024 and 2026 Iranian campaigns against Israel further reinforce that the civilian effects of the missile barrages were not treated as unintended collateral consequences, but rather as demonstrative evidence of strategic success.

Prior to his assassination, IRGC Commander Hossein Salami publicly stated that the April 2024 campaign against Israel, "Operation True Promise," was "more successful than we expected," had produced "devastating effects," and had "established a new equation" of regional deterrence.[49] Similarly, IRGC official Hossein Taeb referenced the use of "strategic weapons" during the 2024 barrages conducted against Israel, terminology particularly significant given the subsequent deployment during the 2026 offensive of cluster-capable and wide-area fragmentation systems.[50] These statements are significant to the *mens rea* analysis as they demonstrate that Iranian leadership evaluated operational success through the anticipated coercive and paralytic effects imposed upon civilian life rather than through the neutralization of discrete military objectives alone.

[45] Human Rights Watch, Questionable Use of Cluster Munitions in Residential Areas of Israel and Iran During the 2026 Conflict (2026); Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas (2022).
[46] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 14: Proportionality in Attack (2005).
[47] Michael Eisenstadt, Iran's Military Strategy: Evolution and Prospects, Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol'y (2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-strategy-evolution-and-prospects; The Implications of Iran's Failed Proxy Strategy, Hoover Inst. (2025), https://www.hoover.org/research/implications-irans-failed-proxy-strategy.
[48] Michael Eisenstadt, Iran's Military Strategy: Evolution and Prospects, Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol'y (2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-strategy-evolution-and-prospects.
[49] Iran Press, Salami: The True Promise Operation, a Lesson to Israel (Apr. 14, 2024), https://iranpress.com/content/277737/salami-the-true-promise-operation-lesson-israel.
[50] IRGC Official Suggests Iran's Strikes on Israel Lacked Strategic Impact, Iran Int'l (Jan. 9, 2025), https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501094148.
[51] Idan Kweller and Guy Elster, *Iran's Shamkhani warns of 'immediate, unprecedented' attack on Tel Aviv in event of US strikes*, The Jerusalem Post (Jan. 28th, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-884894
[52] *IRGC official suggests Iran's strikes on Israel lacked strategic impact*, Iran International (Jan 9 2025), https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501094148

Accordingly, such intent drove Iran's operational conduct in the 2026 offensive. During Iranian state-media broadcasts following successive waves of barrages against Israel in March, senior IRGC officials again characterized the attacks in terms of strategic coercion and deterrence success rather than discrete battlefield gains against military objectives.[53] Such statements frame operational success not through conventional military objectives alone, but through the broader paralysis, coercive pressure, and societal disruption imposed upon civilian populations during the offensive. Iranian state media coverage following cluster munition impacts in Bat Yam similarly treated the visible civilian effects of the strikes as proof of operational effectiveness and the underlying intent.[54]

This rhetoric is consistent with the observable attack structure itself, in which the saturation mathematics of the campaign relied upon civilian penetration rates as an intentional operational feature rather than an unintended byproduct.

The March 2026 strike on the Haifa Oil Refinery, which triggered city-wide power outages, disrupting critical medical infrastructure and other essential services, serves as a concrete illustration of this imbalance.[55] The "concrete and direct" military advantage of disrupting refinery operations is manifestly outweighed by the foreseeable harm to thousands of civilians reliant on grid-dependent life-support systems.

Accordingly, the foreseeable civilian harm exceeds any concrete and direct military advantage, rendering the attacks disproportionate under CIHL Rule 14.



[53] *Imam Mohammad Tawhidi, Doctrine of Disruption: Iran's Strategic Targeting of Civilian Lives and Infrastructure as State Policy*, Trends Rsch. & Advisory (Mar. 19, 2026), https://trendsresearch.org/insight/doctrine-of-disruption-irans-strategic-targeting-of-civilian-lives-and-infrastructure-as-state-policy/.
[54] *At Least 6 Impact Sites Reported in Central Israel After Iranian Cluster Bomb Attack*, Times of Isr. (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/at-least-6-impact-sites-reported-in-central-israel-after-iranian-cluster-bomb-attack/.
[55] Halyna Shpodareva, *Fire Reported at Israel's Largest Haifa Refinery After Iranian Strike*, Ukraine Top News (Mar. 19, 2026), https://glavnoe.in.ua/en/news-en/fire-reported-at-israels-largest-haifa-refinery-after-iranian-strike-video; Reuters, *Iranian Attack Hits Israeli Oil Refinery in Haifa, Some Damage Reported* (Mar. 19, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-attack-hits-israeli-oil-refinery-haifa-some-damage-reported-2026-03-19/.

Prohibition of Acts Intended to Spread Terror (AP I Art. 51(2))

The prohibition on acts intended to spread terror among civilian populations governs the legality of the 2026 offensive under Article 51(2) of AP I, which provides that "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited".[56] The relevant inquiry is therefore not merely whether civilian fear resulted, but whether the operational structure of the campaign was designed to generate sustained civilian terrorization.

International jurisprudence, including Prosecutor v. Galić, establishes that the crime of terror requires specific intent (mens rea) to place civilians in a "constant state of terror," resulting in "extensive trauma and psychological damage".[57] Accordingly, civilian effects are legally relevant insofar as they provide evidence of the intended operational objective.

The evidentiary record of the 2026 campaign establishes this mens rea. The operational pattern, marked by repeated large-scale missile attacks in conjunction with persistent "Red Alert" siren protocols, was structured to and did in fact generate a sustained environment of civilian psychological distress, with the effects serving as evidence of the intended coercive function of the attacks.

The resulting "Educational Blackout" in Israel, including prolonged school closures and the systematic disruption of civilian life under sustained threat, is significant because it demonstrates the foreseeable coercive effects operationally embedded within the barrage structure itself. The foreseeability and persistence of these disruptions provide that such consequences were operationally anticipated and intended rather than merely collateral effects of otherwise discrete military operations. Crucially, official IRGC rhetoric framing the campaign as "Operation True Promise," coupled with explicit references to imposing "maximum cost" on civilian populations, provides direct evidence of intent. When considered together, the scale, repetition, and declared objectives of the attack eliminate plausible alternative explanations.[58]

Accordingly, the record establishes that the offensive was carried out with the specific intent to terrorize the civilian population, in violation of Article 51(2) of AP I.

Amir Levy/Getty Images

A girl passes by a residential building that was destroyed by a ballistic missile fired from Iran, in Bnei Brak, Israel.

[56] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
[57] Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Sentence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
[58] Jonathan Ruhe & Ari Cicurel, Iran's Evolving Missile and Drone Threat, Jewish Inst. for Nat'l Sec. of Am. (Feb. 2026).

Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images

Mourners at a funeral for a mother and her daughter, Sara Elimelech and Ronit Elimelech, after a Iranian missile strike on March 2, 2026 in Beit Shemesh, Israel.

Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images

Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Images

Search and rescue teams and numerous medical units are dispatched after a missile launched by Iran in retaliation for Israeli and US strikes hit a building in the city of Beit Shemesh killing eight Israelis.

Regional Comparative Analysis (Multi-Front Impacts)

Total Iranian Attacks on Multiple Fronts



Iran launched a staggering 2,300 missiles (ballistic, cruise and cluster) and 5,350 UAV's (drones) towards Israel and its Arab neighbors during the conflict.[59] The UAE was targeted with the highest number of drones in the conflict, with over 2,000 drones being launched at their territory.[60] Israel was targeted with the highest number of missiles (650)[61] with the UAE being a close second with 580 missiles.[62]

Residents stand looking towards the damage as first responders work at the site of an Iranian strike in a residential neighbourhood of Bnei Brak on March 31, 2026.

Jack Guez/ Getty Images

[59] All data visualizations throughout this report are generated from an internal proprietary database compiling open-source intelligence (OSINT), cross-referenced with public records, international media reports, and official state government releases.
[60] *UAE Air Defences Intercept 17 Ballistic Missiles and 35 UAVs*, Gulf News (Mar. 15, 2026), https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-air-defences-intercept-17-ballistic-missiles-and-35-uavs-1.500500178#google_vignette .
[61] *Cheap and Elusive Drones Put Incessant Pressure on Israel's Evolving Air Defenses*, Times of Isr. (Mar. 27, 2026), https://www.timesofisrael.com/cheap-and-elusive-drones-put-incessant-pressure-on-israels-evolving-air-defenses/.
[62] *UAE Air Defences*, supra note 12.

These maps* show the location of Iranian missile strikes in various countries on civilian locations, demonstrating the wide geographical spread of the attacks.



Map demonstrating location of Iranian strikes in Israel.



*All maps are built with data sourced from an internal proprietary database compiled from open-source intelligence (OSINT), including public records, media reports, and official government releases.

Map demonstrating location of Iranian strikes in the UAE and Bahrain.





Map demonstrating location of Iranian strikes in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.



Map demonstrating location of Iranian strikes in Oman and Qatar.



Infrastructure Targeting (UAE, Bahrain & Saudi Arabia)

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, strikes across the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia show a consistent pattern of targeting critical civilian and dual-use infrastructure. In the UAE, impacts to aviation infrastructure, including Zayed International Airport, and repeated strikes on petrochemical and export nodes show a focus on key logistical and energy chokepoints. Bahrain reflects the same pattern, with strikes on desalination facilities, Mina Salman Port, and telecommunications infrastructure, as well as in Saudi Arabia. The inclusion of desalination infrastructure is legally significant given its role in potable water supply and protection as an object indispensable to civilian survival.[63]

Civilian harm is further amplified by recurring interception debris, extending effects beyond discrete strike sites.[64]

The dataset is incomplete but consistent. Casualties are likely underreported, munitions attribution remains preliminary, and location data is often generalized.[65; 66; 67] State reporting limits full damage visibility, while interception debris complicates attribution.[68; 69]

The subsequent analytical graphs illustrate the specific infrastructure target profiles, munition type frequencies, and verified civilian casualty distributions across the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.[70] In total, Iran is assessed to have launched 580 missiles and 2,263 UAVs at the UAE,[71] around 194 missiles and 717 UAVs at Bahrain,[72] and approximately 36 missiles and 438 UAVs at Saudi Arabia.[73]



[63] Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, *Customary International Humanitarian Law* r. 54 (2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule54.
[64] *Missile and Drone Interceptions Cause Debris Injuries Across UAE and Bahrain*, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-intercepts-missiles-iran-attack-2026-02-28/.
[65] *UAE Reports Limited Casualty Data Following Infrastructure Strikes*, Reuters (Mar. 1, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-airport-strike-disruption-2026-03-01/.
[66] *Bahrain Reports Damage to Port and Infrastructure After Regional Attacks*, Reuters (Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-port-damage-iran-attack-2026-03-02/.
[67] *Drone and Missile Debris Cause Injuries in Bahrain Urban Areas*, Al Jazeera (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/9/bahrain-injuries-missile-debris.
[68] *Strikes on Gulf Energy Infrastructure Disrupt Operations in UAE*, Reuters (Mar. 14, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-oil-port-strikes-fujairah-2026-03-14/.
[69] Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Customary International Humanitarian Law* rr. 11–12 (2005).
[70] All data visualizations throughout this report are generated from an internal proprietary database compiling open-source intelligence (OSINT), cross-referenced with public records, international media reports, and official state government releases.
[71] UAE Air Defences Intercept 17 Ballistic Missiles and 35 UAVs, Gulf News (Mar. 15, 2026), https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-air-defences-intercept-17-ballistic-missiles-and-35-uavs-1.500500178#google_vignette .
[72] @GDNonline, *GDN Online Regional Defense Tracking Post*, X (Mar. 2026, 10:14 AM), https://x.com/GDNonline/status/2044713172721164400.
[73] *Saudi Arabia Condemns Iranian Attacks as Flagrant Violation of Sovereignty*, Arab News (Mar. 25, 2026), [.3] https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636765/saudi-arabia.

UAE- Munition type frequency



Fadel SENNA / AFP via Getty Images

People cross a street as smoke rises from the site of a reported Iranian strike in Dubai on March 1, 2026.



Submitted by the Jerusalem Institute of Justice (JIJ)

Table 1 Infrastructure Targeting UAE pt. 1

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
28.2.26	Abu Dhabi / Dubai	Airports / urban infrastructure and civilian areas	Multi-site missile strikes with urban impacts, interceptions, and debris; explosions across cities; disruption to aviation and civilian activity, fire in Palm Jumeirah area	3 killed; 58 reported across UAE	Al Jazeera, Reuters
28.2.26	Dubai	Airport-adjacent infrastructure	Debris from interceptions caused fires near airport zones and surrounding infrastructure; impacts near aviation corridors	4 injured in Dubai from debris impacts	Al Jazeera, Reuters
28.2.26	Dubai (Burj Al Arab)	Civilian landmark / airport-adjacent infrastructure	Minor fire caused by drone/interception debris impacting façade; tourism infrastructure impact	No casualties reported	Al Arabiya English, Gulf News
1.3.26	Dubai	Civilian infrastructure: Dubai International Airport	Strike and/or debris impact affecting major international transit hub; operational disruption	4 injured from debris impacts	Business Insider
1.3.26	Abu Dhabi	Civilian infrastructure: Zayed International Airport	Strike and/or debris impact affecting major international transit hub; operational disruption	1 killed, 7 wounded	Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya English, Reuters
2.3.26	Musaffah (Abu Dhabi)	Fuel tank terminal (energy infrastructure)	Drone strike caused minor fire at fuel storage facility	No casualties reported	Al Jazeera, Reuters,
3.3.26	Dubai (U.S. Consulate vicinity)	Civilian urban infrastructure	Drone strike caused minor fire near diplomatic and civilian infrastructure	No casualties reported	Al Jazeera, Reuters
7.3.26	Dubai (Al Barsha Area)	Civilian infrastructure	Debris from aerial interception fell onto a vehicle and high-rise building	1 casualty reported	9News
7.3.26	Dubai International Airport	Civilian infrastructure: Dubai International Airport	Drone strike caused minor fire near Dubai International Airport	No casualties reported	BBC
10.3.26	Ruwais (ADNOC refinery)	Energy infrastructure	Drone strike triggered minor fire; refinery operations disrupted	No casualties reported	Al Jazeera, Reuters

Table 1 Infrastructure Targeting UAE pt. 2

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
11.3.26	Dubai International Airport	Civilian infrastructure: Dubai International Airport	2 drones fell near Dubai International Airport however no visible damage to the airport.	4 injuries reported	Reuters
12.3.26	Dubai (Creek Harbour)	Civilian infrastructure	Drone falls on residential buildings.	No injuries reported	Khaleej Times
13.3.26	Dubai (DIFC Innovation Hub)	Civilian infrastructure	Interception debris falls on an office building in Central Dubai.	No injuries reported	Construction Wee
14–17.3.26,	Fujairah	Oil port / logistics infrastructure	Drone strikes caused large fires and disrupted oil loading operations at major export hub	No casualties reported	Al Jazeera, Reuters
16.3.26,	Abu Dhabi (Shah Field)	Gas / energy infrastructure	Drone strike caused fire at Shah gas field; operations suspended into March 17	No casualties reported	Al Jazeera, Reuters
16.3.26	Dubai International Airport	Civilian infrastructure: Dubai International Airport	Drone strike hit a fuel tank near the international airport, causing a fire. This led to suspension of flights.	No casualties reported	Reuters
16.3.26	Abu Dhabi (Al Bahyah area)	Civilian infrastructure	Missile strike on civilian vehicle.	1 casualty reported	The Wall Street Journal
17.3.26	Abu Dhabi (Baniyas Area)	Civilian infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted missile attack.	1 casualty reported	Arab News
18.3.26-19.3.26	Habshan Gas Facilities, Bab Field	Gas / energy infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted missile attack. The gas facilities were subsequently shut down.	No injuries reported.	The Wall Street Journal
23.3.26	Abu Dhabi (Al Shawamekh area)	Civilian infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted missile attack.	1 injury reported.	Anadolu Agency

Table 1 Infrastructure Targeting UAE pt. 3

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
26.3.26	Abu Dhabi (Sweihan street)	Civilian infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted missile attack.	2 casualties and 3 injuries reported.	Qatar News Agency
28.3.26	Abu Dhabi (Al Taweelah)	Logistics infrastructure	“Significant” damage sustained to an Emirates Aluminum production base and had to temporarily stop production.	6 injuries reported.	The Times of Israel
31.3.26	Dubai	Civilian infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted missile attack.	4 injuries reported.	Khaleej Times
1.4.26	Umm Al Quwain, Fujairah	Logistics infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted drone attack.	1 casualty and 1 injury reported.	Gulf News
3.4.26	Habshan and Ajban Gas Facilities.	Gas / energy infrastructure	Two fires which were sparked by debris from a successful air defense interception in Habshan, debris falling in Ajban.	1 casualty and 4 injuries reported in Habshan/ 12 injuries reported in Ajban	Gulf News
4.4.26-5.4.26,,	UAE (multiple sites; Ruwais Industrial City)	Petrochemical facilities (incl. Borouge plant)	Strikes on petrochemical infrastructure caused multiple fires at facilities following direct impacts and interception debris; operations suspended pending damage assessment; part of coordinated regional strike wave targeting Gulf energy infrastructure	No injuries reported at UAE petrochemical sites	Arab News, Al Arabiya English, Reuters
6.4.26	Abu Dhabi (Musaffah Area)	Civilian Infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted attack.	1 injury reported.	Khaleej Times
8.4.26	Habshan Gas Facilities	Gas / energy infrastructure	Debris from an intercepted attack, which also caused several fires at the facility. Operations were subsequently suspended.	3 injuries reported.	Khaleej Times
4.5.26	Fujairah	Gas / energy infrastructure	Drone attack resulting in a fire.	3 injuries reported.	NDTV World

Bahrain- Attack targets



Kamikaze drone attack targets Manama, capital of Bahrain

Andolu/Getty Images

Bahrain- Munition type frequency



Table 2 Infrastructure Targeting Bahrain

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
28.2.26	Manama (residential area)	Civilian residential building	Strike caused structural damage to residential building; blast effects in urban area	Not reported	CNN, Al Arabiya English
1.3.26	Manama (Crowne Plaza hotel)	Civilian (hotel)	Drone strike caused damage and injuries at hotel site	Injuries reported	ABC, Al Arabiya English
1.3.26	Manama (AWS data center)	Civilian infrastructure (tech)	Drone/debris caused damage to data infrastructure and service disruption	Not reported	Khaleej Times, Al Arabiya English
2.3.26	Mina Salman Port	Civilian infrastructure (port)	Missile debris struck tanker causing fire and port disruption	1 killed, 2 injured	The Times of Israel, Al Arabiya English
5.3.26	Ma'ameer industrial area	Industrial infrastructure	Strike caused damage within industrial zone	Not reported	BBC, Al Jazeera
8.3.26	Bahrain (desalination facility)	Civilian infrastructure (water)	Drone strike caused damage to desalination plant	3 injured	Iran International, Arab News
9.3.26	Manama (urban area)	Civilian (indirect)	Missile/drone debris caused widespread injuries in populated area	32 injured	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
10.3.26	Manama (office tower)	Civilian (commercial building)	Drone debris struck tower causing fatality and injuries	1 killed, 8 injured	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
12.3.26	Muharraq	Energy infrastructure (fuel depot)	Strike triggered large fire at fuel facility	Not reported	Al Jazeera, The Independent
20.3.26	Manama	Civilian	Debris caused warehouse fire	Not reported	CNN, Al Arabiya
28.3.26	Alba	Industrial infrastructure	Strike damaged aluminium plant; operational disruption	2 injured	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
1.4.26	Manama	Civilian infrastructure (telecom)	Missile/drone strike damaged telecommunications infrastructure	Not reported	Free Press, Al Arabiya
5.4.26	Bahrain refinery	Energy infrastructure	Strike caused damage to refinery operations	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
8.4.26	Sitra	Civilian residential area	Drone strikes	Not reported	Euronews, Al Jazeera





Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Images

A view of damage after a kamikaze drone struck several buildings in Manama, Bahrain



Table 3 Infrastructure Targeting Saudi Arabia

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
1.3.26	Riyadh International Airport	Civilian Infrastructure	Undisclosed	Undisclosed	The Times of Israel
2.3.26	Ras Tanura Oil Refinery	Gas/Energy Infrastructure	Fire caused by drone interception. The refinery was subsequently closed.	No injuries reported.	The Times of Israel
3.3.26	US Embassy	Civilian Infrastructure	“Limited fire and minor material damages.” after two drones hit the US Embassy.	No injuries reported.	CNN
4.3.26	Ras Tanura Oil Refinery	Gas/Energy Infrastructure	Struck by a drone.	Undisclosed	Reuters
8.3.26	Al-Kharj	Civilian Infrastructure	Projectile fell onto a residential location.	2 casualties, 12 injuries	Reuters
19.3.26	Samref Oil Refinery	Gas/Energy Infrastructure	Drone strike on the Samref Oil Refinery. Minimal damage reported.	No injuries reported.	The Wall Street Journal
31.3.26	Al-Kharj	Civilian Infrastructure	Debris from a drone interception struck 6 residential homes, causing minor property damage.	No injuries reported.	Qatar News Agency

Sovereignty & Debris Risk (Jordan, Kuwait & Kurdistan)

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, Jordan and Kuwait experienced repeated spillover effects from the regional campaign, primarily through interception debris impacting civilian areas. Missile interceptions over Amman and Kuwait City generated falling debris across residential neighborhoods, causing injuries and localized damage.

In Kuwait, this pattern is compounded by direct strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure, including airport systems, power grids, and desalination facilities. The result is sustained civilian exposure within non-belligerent territory, raising sovereignty concerns tied to cross-border effects of force.[74]

The table below only shows confirmed impacts and damage incidents rather than the total volume of attacks. During the reporting period, approximately 22 missiles and 240 UAVs were launched toward Jordanian territory,[75] 365 missiles and 786 UAVs were launched toward Kuwait.[76]

The legal significance of these incidents lies in the predictability of harm extending beyond intended strike zones. Even where impacts result from interception rather than direct targeting, the repeated pattern of debris-related injuries and infrastructure damage reflects foreseeable effects in densely populated areas.[77]



[74] U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
[75] *Jordan Says Over 240 Missiles and Drones Intercepted Since Start of War,* Anadolu Ajansı (Mar. 28, 2026), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/jordan-says-over-240-missiles-and-drones-intercepted-since-start-of-war/3883138.
[76] *Kuwait Says It Intercepted 14 Ballistic Missiles, 2 Cruise Missiles, 46 Drones in 24 Hours*, Anadolu Ajansı (Apr. 6, 2026), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/kuwait-says-it-intercepted-14-ballistic-missiles-2-cruise-missiles-46-drones-in-24-hours/3895215.
[77] Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Customary International Humanitarian Law* rr. 11–12 (2005).

Map of civilian impacts in Jordan



This map* demonstrates the locations within Jordan which were impacted by Iranian missiles or interception debris, in blue. The red points demonstrate the locations of US and Jordanian military bases, demonstrating the distance between civilian damage and valid military targets. Even if Jordan's airspace or US bases are valid military targets, raining imprecise missile debris on civilian neighborhoods still constitutes an indiscriminate attack and establishes a territorial basis for ICC jurisdiction.

*The information for this map was pulled from Jordan Armed Forces and Petra reporting, incidents of debris and failed interceptions were recorded across multiple governorates, with aggregated reporting


Kuwait- Number of Killed and Injured in Iranian Attacks
Killed
Injured
0
10
20
30
40


Kuwait- Munition type frequency
25.0%
75.0%
Drone strike
Interception debris from missiles/drones

Table 4 Infrastructure Targeting Kuwait pt. 1

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
28.2.26	Kuwait City (Farwaniya / airport corridor; Salwa & Rumaithiya districts)	Civilian urban areas (indirect; residential exposure)	Missile interceptions over Kuwait City generated blast effects and debris dispersal	32 Injuries reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
28.2.26	Kuwait International Airport (Farwaniya Governorate)	Civilian infrastructure (airport terminal)	Drone strike damaged Terminal 1	Injuries reported (airport personnel)	Reuteurs, Asharq Al-Awsat
4.3.26	Kuwait City (residential district)	Civilian (direct residential impact)	Falling interception debris struck a residential home, causing localized structural damage	1 killed multiple injured	Asharq Al-Awsat, Al Arabiya
12.3.26	Kuwait City (airport-adjacent transmission grid)	Civilian infrastructure (electricity)	Drone debris severed six power transmission lines,	Not reported	Iran International, Al Arabiya
17.3.26	Kuwait City metropolitan area (Salwa, Rumaithiya, coastal districts)	Civilian (indirect residential exposure)	Repeated missile and drone interceptions produced debris impacts	2 Injuries reported	Reuters, Al Jazeera
19-20.3.26	Mina al-Ahmadi (Ahmadi Governorate)	Oil refinery (energy infrastructure	Drone strikes ignited fires across multiple refinery units	No injuries reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
24.3.26	Kuwait International Airport	Civilian infrastructure (fuel depot)	Drone strike hit fuel tank, causing sustained fire and visible smoke plume	No injuries reported	Reuteurs, Iran International
28.3.26	Kuwait International Airport	Civilian infrastructure	Drone attacks caused significant damage to radar system	No injuries reported	Reuteurs, Arab Times
30.3.26	Northern Kuwait (Subiya desalination & power complex)	Civilian infrastructure (water & electricity)	Strike damaged desalination and power facilities supplying civilian population	1 killed	Al Jazeera

Table 4 Infrastructure Targeting Kuwait pt. 2

Date	Location	Target	Damage/Effects	Casualties	Sources
3.4.26	Mina al-Ahmadi refinery (Ahmadi Governorate)	Energy infrastructure	Drone strikes caused fires in refinery operational units;	No injuries reported	Reuteurs, Arab News
3.4.26	Kuwait (power & desalination plant)	Civilian infrastructure	Strike caused structural damage to power and desalination facility	Not reported	Reuteurs, Arab News
5.4.26	Kuwait City & national grid infrastructure	Civilian infrastructure (power + desalination)	Drone strikes targeted water and electricity systems supplying civilian population	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Arab News
5.4.26	KPC / KNPC facilities (Mina Abdullah & Ahmadi region)	Energy infrastructure	Drone strikes caused severe material damage to oil facilities and processing infrastructure	No casualties reported	The Guardian, Arab News
6.4.26	Kuwait City residential districts	Civilian (indirect residential impact)	Debris from aerial attacks caused injuries across populated neighborhoods	6 injured	Iran International, Al Jazeera
8.4.26	Kuwait: nationwide	Civilian infrastructure	Coordinated drone wave	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
9.4.26	Kuwait (national infrastructure network)	Civilian infrastructure (vital facilities)	Drone attacks targeting critical infrastructure	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera, Arab Times

Table 5 Infrastructure Targeting Jordan

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
28.2.26	Not specified (urban areas)	Civilian (indirect; residential exposure)	Missile interceptions generated debris fallout across populated areas; indirect blast effects and localized civilian exposure	Injuries reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
4.3.26	Amman (residential area)	Civilian (indirect residential impact)	Drone crash into residential neighborhood causing structural damage to homes	1 injured	The New Arab, Al arabiya

Table 6 Infrastructure Targeting Iraqi Kurdistan

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
28.2.26	Erbil (airport vicinity)	Civilian / dual-use infrastructure (airport corridor)	Reported UAV activity near airport	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
1.3.26	Erbil (residential-adjacent zones)	Civilian (indirect exposure)	Localized impact/possible debris affecting nearby civilian areas	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
3.3.26	Erbil region (infrastructure corridors)	Civilian / infrastructure	Reported drone incursion	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
10.3.26	Erbil (airport corridor)	Civilian / dual-use infrastructure	Renewed UAV activity near airport; heightened alert/ disruption risk	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
17.3.26	Erbil (urban periphery)	Civilian (indirect exposure)	Possible interception effects/localized disruption in populated areas	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
24.3.26	Erbil region	Civilian / infrastructure	Continued sporadic drone incursions	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
30.3.26	Erbil (residential areas)	Civilian (indirect exposure)	Reported localized disturbances	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
4.4.26	Erbil (airport vicinity)	Civilian / dual-use infrastructure	UAV presence near airport	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
9.4.26	Iraqi Kurdistan (generalized)	Civilian (regional exposure)	Ongoing spillover effects	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera

During the February–April 2026 campaign, Iraqi Kurdistan experienced limited but notable spillover effects, primarily involving drone incursions and localized impacts near Erbil and surrounding infrastructure corridors.[78] Reported incidents include UAV activity in proximity to Erbil International Airport and adjacent civilian areas, alongside possible interception-related effects.[79] Although the charts below record only confirmed impacts and documented incidents, around 800 missiles and UAVs were launched toward Iraqi Kurdistan territory. [80]

While civilian exposure is documented, casualty reporting remains limited and attribution is less definitive than in other theaters, with some incidents potentially linked to Iranian-origin systems and others to proxy-aligned activity. As a result, Kurdistan is best characterized as a secondary impact zone, reflecting both direct and indirect cross-border effects of force rather than a sustained, clearly attributable strike environment. [81, 82]



Smoke rises from an oil warehouse on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of Iraq's Kurdistan Region, following a suspected drone strike on April 1, 2026.

Gailan Haji/Getty Images

[78] Ahmad Sharawi, *Iran's War Against Regional States: UAE Bore the Brunt, Iraqi Kurdistan Still Under Fire*, FDD's Long War Journal (Apr. 18, 2026), https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/04/irans-war-against-regional-states-uae-bore-the-brunt-iraqi-kurdistan-still-under-fire.php.
[79] *Blasts Heard Near Erbil Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reports*, AFP (Apr. 7, 2026), https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/04/07/blasts-heard-near-erbil-airport-in-iraqi-kurdistan-reports
[80] *Kurdistan Region Hit by 809 Drone and Missile Attacks, Government Says,* Kurdistan24 (Apr. 25, 2026), https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/910211/kurdistan-region-hit-by-809-drone-and-missile-attacks-government-says.
[81] *Explosions Reported Near Erbil Amid Regional Escalation*, Al Jazeera (Mar. 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/explosions-near-erbil-regional-escalation.
[82] Drone Incident Near Erbil Airport Raises Security Concerns, Reuters (Mar. 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-incident-erbil-airport-2026-03/.

Maritime & Airspace Violations

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, Iran's campaign extended into sovereign airspace and maritime domains, producing a consistent pattern of cross-border incursions affecting Cyprus, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Unlike debris-driven spillover observed in Jordan and Kuwait, these incidents involve direct or attempted penetration of sovereign territory, including two ballistic missiles overflight into Turkish airspace,[83] UAV incursions targeting installations in Cyprus,[84] and an offensive wave of four one-way attack drones impacting infrastructure in Azerbaijan.[85]

Although fewer maritime-specific impacts were publicly confirmed in these three states relative to the Gulf, the record reflects spillover risk into nearby maritime zones, including missile trajectories and UAV paths traversing Eastern Mediterranean and Caspian-adjacent corridors. The pattern reflects not incidental spillover, but the extension of operational effects into third-party jurisdictions.[86; 87; 88]

The legal significance is direct. Cross-border missile trajectories, UAV incursions, and drone strikes into sovereign territory constitute prima facie violations of sovereignty and implicate the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) where not consented to or otherwise justified.[89] Interception does not negate the violation where territorial penetration occurs or is attempted.[90] Repeated missile entries into Turkish airspace and confirmed drone impacts in Azerbaijan demonstrate that these incidents were not isolated, but part of a sustained pattern of cross-border conduct with legally cognizable consequences.[91]

Airspace penetration alone is sufficient to establish a violation of state sovereignty under customary international law,[92] while the proximity of these offensive operations to vital regional maritime corridors further underscores the transboundary character of the campaign and its impact on neutral commerce.[93]

[83] *Jordan Says Over 240 Missiles and Drones Intercepted Since Start of War,* Anadolu Ajansı (Mar. 28, 2026), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/jordan-says-over-240-missiles-and-drones-intercepted-since-start-of-war/3883138.
[84] *Greece and Cyprus in the War Against Iran*, Joint Inst. for Nat'l Sec. of Am. (JINSA) (Apr. 6, 2026), https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/greece-and-cyprus-in-the-war-against-iran/.
[85] *The Caucasus Front: Azerbaijan and Iran in the Expanding Gulf War,* Gulf Int'l Forum (Mar. 15, 2026), https://gulfif.org/the-caucasus-front-azerbaijan-and-iran-in-the-expanding-gulf-war/.
[86] *Turkey Says NATO Defences Destroyed Missile Fired from Iran Over Mediterranean*, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-nato-defences-destroyed-missile-fired-iran-over-mediterranean-2026-03-04/; see also *NATO Defences Destroy Missile Fired from Iran Over Mediterranean: Turkiye*, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/nato-defences-destroy-missile-fired-from-iran-over-mediterranean-turkiye.
[87] *Azerbaijan Says Iranian Drones Hit Airport, Injure Four*, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/missiles-drones-coming-iran-fell-airport-azerbaijan-source-says-2026-03-05/; see also *Iranian Drones Hit Airport in Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan Exclave*, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/5/iranian-drones-hit-airport-in-azerbaijans-exclave-as-us-israel-war-widens.
[88] *Iranian-Made Drone Hits British Air Base in Cyprus,* REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/british-air-base-cyprus-hit-by-suspected-drone-strike-sky-news-reports-2026-03-02/; see also British Military Base in Cyprus Targeted in Suspected Drone Attack, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/british-military-base-in-cyprus-targeted-in-suspected-drone-attack.
[89] U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
[90] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 111, ¶ 195 (June 27).
[91] *Turkey Tells Iran Violation of Its Airspace Unacceptable*, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-tells-iran-violation-its-airspace-unacceptable-2026-03-10/
[92] Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (affirming that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory).
[93] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 58, 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (detailing the rights of non-belligerent transit navigation within contiguous maritime corridors).

Table 7 Violations Targeting Cyprus, Turkey, and Azerbaijan

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
1–2.3.26	Cyprus: RAF Akrotiri (coastal base)	Military installation / sovereign airspace	UAV strike damaged hangar; additional drones intercepted; airfield disruption	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
2.3.26	Cyprus: Paphos (airport corridor)	Civilian infrastructure / sovereign airspace	Airport evacuation; reported UAV activity	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
4.3.26	Cyprus FIR / Eastern Mediterranean approaches	Sovereign airspace / maritime-adjacent zone	UAVs intercepted over maritime approach corridors; no confirmed impact	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
4.3.26	Turkey: Hatay / southern airspace	Sovereign airspace	Missile entered airspace; intercepted; debris fell in Hatay	None reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
5.3.26	Azerbaijan: Nakhchivan (airport + civilian zone)	Civilian / dual-use infrastructure	Drone strike damaged airport terminal; impact near school	4 injured	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
9.3.26	Southern Turkey	Sovereign airspace	Second missile entered airspace; intercepted by NATO systems	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
13.3.26	Turkey: Incirlik corridor	Sovereign airspace / military-adjacent	Third missile intercepted; repeated incursions confirmed	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs
30.3.26	Southern Turkey	Sovereign airspace	Fourth missile incursion; intercepted; formal protest issued	Not reported	Al Jazeera, Reuteurs

Other

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, Qatar, Oman, and Lebanon experienced both direct strikes and spillover effects from the regional campaign, affecting civilian areas, energy infrastructure, and maritime assets. In Qatar, there were approximately 200 missiles and 70 UAVs attacks.[94] Missile interceptions over Doha generated debris across residential neighborhoods, while subsequent strikes targeted LNG and industrial facilities at Ras Laffan and Mesaieed, as well as maritime assets in Qatari waters.[95; 96]

In Oman, the pattern is more direct, with around 19 drone strikes[97] on ports and industrial infrastructure (Duqm, Salalah, Sohar) producing structural damage and civilian casualties.[98; 99]

In Lebanon, the primary impact consisted of interception debris falling in residential areas, creating indirect civilian exposure.[100]

These incidents reflect a combined pattern of infrastructure targeting and foreseeable civilian harm extending across both belligerent-adjacent and non-belligerent territory, with particular significance for energy and maritime systems central to regional stability.[101]

The dataset is incomplete but consistent. Casualties are likely underreported, munitions attribution remains preliminary, and location data is often generalized. State reporting limits full damage visibility, while interception debris complicates attribution.



[94] *Ahmad Sharawi, Iran's War Against Regional States: UAE Bore the Brunt, Iraqi Kurdistan Still Under Fire*, FDD's Long War Journal (Apr. 18, 2026), https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/04/irans-war-against-regional-states-uae-bore-the-brunt-iraqi-kurdistan-still-under-fire.php.
[95] *Qatar Says Iran Attack Caused Significant Damage at Ras Laffan Gas Facility*, Al Jazeera (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/18/qatar-ras-laffan-gas-damage.
[96] *Qatar Intercepts Missiles; Debris Injures Civilians*, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-intercepts-missiles-2026-02-28/.
[97] *Iran Launched 5,471 Missile and Drone Attacks on Seven Arab Countries Since Feb. 28*, Yeni Şafak (Mar. 30, 2026), https://en.yenisafak.com/world/iran-launched-5471-missile-and-drone-attacks-on-seven-arab-countries-since-feb-28-3716463.
[98] *Drone Hits Fuel Tank at Oman's Duqm Port*, Reuters (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-hits-fuel-tank-omans-duqm-port-2026-03-03/.
[99] *Two Killed in Drone Strike in Sohar*, Reuters (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-killed-drone-strike-sohar-2026-03-13/.
[100] *Debris Falls in Lebanon After Interceptions*, Guardian (Apr. 4, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/04/lebanon-debris-falls-after-interceptions.
[101] Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Customary International Humanitarian Law* rr. 11–12 (2005).


Oman attack targets
16.7%
83.3%
Maritime infrastructure
Civilian infrastructure


Oman- Number of Killed and Injured in Iranian Attacks
Killed
Injured
0
5
10
15
20

Table 8 Attacks Targeting Qatar, Oman, and Lebanon

Qatar

Date	Location	Target	Damage / Effects	Casualties	Sources
28.2.26	Doha (residential areas)	Civilian (indirect; residential exposure)	Missile interceptions over Doha generated debris dispersal across residential neighborhoods	16 injured	Reuteurs
2.3.26	Qatar: nationwide	Civilian infrastructure	Airport related infrastructure	Not reported	Reuteurs
2.3.26	Ras Laffan; Mesaieed (industrial zones)	Energy infrastructure	Drone strikes targeting state-linked industrial and energy facilities;	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
18.3.26	Ras Laffan gas facility	Energy infrastructure	Incident caused significant damage to gas infrastructure	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
1.4.26	Qatari waters (oil tanker)	Energy / maritime infrastructure	Missile strike hit oil tanker	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
8.4.26	Muraikh (residential)	Unspecified	Limited material damage	4 injuries	Reuteurs

Oman

1.3.26	Arabian Sea (Omani maritime zone)	Maritime infrastructure (oil tanker)	Tanker strike caused structural damage	4 injured	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
1.3.26	Port of Duqm	Civilian infrastructure	Drone strikes on port infrastructure	1 injured	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
3.3.26	Duqm Port (fuel storage)	Civilian infrastructure	Drone strike hit fuel tank	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Arabiya
11.3.26	Salalah Port	Civilian infrastructure	Drone strike triggered large fire	Not reported	Reuteurs, Al Jazeera
13.3.26	Sohar (industrial area)	Civilian / industrial infrastructure	Drone strike caused fatalities and injuries; direct hit within industrial zone	2 killed, 10 injured	Reuteurs, Econ Times, Khaleej Times
28.3.26	Salalah Port	Civilian infrastructure	Attack injured port worker	1 injured	Gulf Times, Al Arabiya

Lebanon

4.4.26	Southern Lebanon (residential area)	Civilian (indirect; residential exposure)	Missile interceptions generated debris fallout across residential areas; indirect exposure risk to civilians	Not confirmed	The Guardian, Al Jazeera

Case Study: The Systematic Impact on Israel

Scale of the Offensive

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, the Iranian offensive against Israel was characterized by a sustained, high-volume campaign of ballistic missile fire directed toward Israeli civilian population centers, supplemented by the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the systematic use of cluster-capable warheads. Credible reporting from analytical datasets indicates that Iran launched 479 missile barrages toward Israel during this period, with early-phase volumes reaching significantly higher levels before degrading under sustained Israeli counterstrikes.[102]

The recorded figure of 479 barrages does not represent the total sum of munitions launched, as a "barrage" is defined as a discrete launch event that frequently contained multiple simultaneous projectiles. For example, Iran launched approximately 90 missiles on February 28 and 60 missiles on March 1 alone.[103]

This high-intensity campaign featured multiple daily barrages, at times exceeding 20 launch waves in a single day at the outset of hostilities, before declining as Israeli strikes eliminated an estimated 300 missile launchers, contributing to a reported reduction in firing rates of approximately 70% over time.[104]

OLYMPIA DE MAISMONT / AFP via Getty Images

A man sits next to a tent and looks at a child running in an underground parking used as a bomb shelter during an alert in Israel's coastal city of Tel Aviv on March 9, 2026.

David Silverman/Getty Images

An elderly Israeli woman takes cover in a public bomb shelter during an Iranian missile attack on March 20, 2026 in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Wisam Hashlamoun/Anadolu via Getty Images

Missiles launched from Iran towards Israel are seen in the sky over Hebron in the West Bank on March 20, 2026.

[102]: Steven Scheer, Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18/.
[103]: Iran Update Special Report, Inst. for the Study of War & Critical Threats Project (Mar. 27, 2026), https://www.understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-27-2026.
[104]: Phil Stewart & Idrees Ali, Exclusive: U.S. Can Only Confirm About a Third of Iran's Missile Arsenal Destroyed, Reuters (Mar. 27, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-can-only-confirm-about-third-irans-missile-arsenal-destroyed-sources-say-2026-03-27/; see also Iran Update Special Report, Inst. for the Study of War & Critical Threats Project (Mar. 24–27, 2026), https://www.understandingwar.org/.

Concurrently, Iran deployed over 100 UAVs against Israeli targets, functioning both as direct attack tools and as saturation mechanisms designed to strain Israel's layered aerial defense systems.[105] A defining feature of the offensive was the systematic integration of cluster munition warheads into Iran's ballistic missile arsenal. Reporting confirms that dozens of cluster-armed ballistic missiles were launched into Israeli airspace, with documented strikes occurring as early as March 1 and continuing throughout the 2026 campaign.[106] These weapon systems are operationally distinct: each missile disperses dozens of submunitions over wide-area urban localities, significantly expanding the zone of impact and increasing the probability of civilian harm.[107]

By early March, Israeli and U.S. reporting documented over 1,000 total injuries attributable to missile attacks, including both direct blast effects and secondary injuries caused by fragmentation, debris, and rapid civilian shelter mobilization.[108] Individual strike events further illustrate the scale: a March 22 barrage involving two ballistic missile penetrations in southern Israel resulted in extensive civilian injuries and residential destruction, while subsequent cluster strikes dispersed submunitions across multiple urban areas in central Israel from a single event.[109]

Erik Marmor/Getty Images

Tel Aviv, Israel - February 28: patients are moved to an underground car park at Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center (Ichilov Hostpial) amid reports on incoming missiles.

Amir Levy/Getty Images

Bnei Brak, Israel - March 25: bystanders inspect a destroyed apartment after a hit from a part of a ballistic missile fird from Iran, leaving two injured.

Alexi Rosenfeld/Getty Images

Dimona, Israel - March 22: home hit by an Iranina ballistic missile in Dimona.

[105]: Iran Update Special Report, Inst. for the Study of War & Critical Threats Project (Mar. 2026), https://www.understandingwar.org/; Steven Scheer, Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18/.
[106]: Steven Scheer, Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18/
[107]: Id.
[108]: Iran Update Special Report, Inst. for the Study of War & Critical Threats Project (Mar. 2026), https://www.criticalthreats.org/; Under the Iron Dome: Iranian Strikes Pierce Israel's Missile Shield, Reuters (Mar. 27, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/.
[109]: Scores Hurt After Iranian Missiles Hit Israeli Desert Towns, Reuters (Mar. 22, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/scores-hurt-after-iranian-missiles-hit-israeli-desert-towns-2026-03-22/

Despite the scale of the offensive, Israeli defensive systems maintained interception rates approximating 90–92%, significantly preventing the translation of attack volume into mass-casualty situations.[200] This data reflects a dual reality: a large, adaptive Iranian missile campaign, hundreds of ballistic systems, cluster-enabled strikes, and sustained UAV use, countered by Israel's defensive environment in which most munitions were intercepted before impact. Consequently, the relatively low fatality figures are a direct result of interception efficacy and civil defense compliance rather than Iranian operational restraint; these factors materially curtailed the transition of high-volume fire into mass-casualty events within dense urban sectors.

Educational System Paralysis

From February 28 through April 8, 2026, Israel's education system underwent immediate and sustained disruption as a direct consequence of continuous Iranian missile and UAV attacks on civilian population centers. Nationwide school closures were imposed on February 28 pursuant to Home Front Command emergency directives, with all educational institutions transitioned to remote learning frameworks by March 1.[201]

These closures continued for approximately five weeks, interrupted only by limited, geographically contingent reopenings in lower-risk areas before renewed large-scale barrages on March 21–22, including strikes on Dimona and Arad, causing mass civilian casualties, forced a return to full nationwide shutdown.[202] By early April, in-person education had effectively been suspended across major population centers for over one month, with additional disruptions caused by the cancellation of nationwide educational programming, including Passover school activities across multiple municipalities.[203]

The inability to safely resume in-person education, even during temporary operational lulls, was driven by structural infrastructure deficiencies. Knesset Research Center data indicate that approximately 450,000–466,000 students, or roughly one-quarter of Israel's student population, lack adequate protected school infrastructure, including 14% of schools with no shelter access and 24% with only partial protection.[204] These deficiencies are operationally determinative given Israel's civil defense requirements, which mandate that civilians reach protected space within approximately 15–30 seconds of a "Red Alert" siren.[205] For younger children especially, reaching shelter within seconds is often unrealistic without immediate access, making sustained reopening unsafe under constant alert conditions.

[200]: Steven Scheer, Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18/
[201]: Keshet Neev, Schools to Move to Remote Learning on Monday After Shutdown Amid Iranian Missile Strikes, Jerusalem Post (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-888282 (confirming nationwide closure of all educational sectors following sustained missile attacks on civilian areas, necessitating immediate emergency transition to remote learning)
[202]: Keshet Neev, Israeli Schools to Continue in Remote Format Amid War Despite Workplace Reopening, Jerusalem Post (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-889030
[203]: Tobias Siegal, Schools to Gradually Reopen After Ceasefire, with Uneven Rollout Across Israel, Times of Israel (Apr. 8, 2026), https://www.timesofisrael.com/
[204]: Knesset Research & Information Center, Educational Infrastructure and Shelter Gaps (2026)
[205]: Israel Defense Forces, Home Front Command, Civil Defense Guidelines (2026)

The transition to remote learning, while necessary, constituted a materially deficient substitute for in-person instruction. Instruction took place under constant threat—regularly interrupted by sirens, interceptions, and the need to move to shelter—breaking continuity and reducing effectiveness.[206] The Ministry of Education further acknowledged gaps in identifying students lacking digital access, reinforcing pre-existing inequalities. These outcomes are consistent with extensive COVID-era empirical research demonstrating that remote learning produces measurable learning loss, reduced engagement, and widened achievement gaps, with persistent deficits in literacy, numeracy, and long-term attainment outcomes.[207]

The "Red Alert" environment further transformed education into a survival-dependent system. Students operated under continuous, short-notice alerts requiring immediate sheltering, collapsing the boundary between routine educational activity and emergency response. Even where schools briefly reopened, they functioned as shelter-dependent environments, while remote learning often occurred from within protected spaces. Contemporary reporting described classrooms as reduced to "bunkers, zoom screens, and in some cases, rubble," reflecting both the physical and operational degradation of educational infrastructure under sustained attack.[208]

This disruption was compounded by direct exposure of educational environments to kinetic effects. Missile strikes in Arad and Dimona on March 21–22 caused mass civilian injuries, including children in residential buildings, alongside broader damage to civilian infrastructure.[209] These incidents reflect direct exposure of children to blast and fragmentation in civilian environments. Emerging data also indicate measurable psychological harm among youth, with roughly 40% of adolescents showing clinically abnormal symptoms, including anxiety and impaired functioning.[210] While long-term PTSD rates remain under study, the sustained conditions—continuous alerts, unpredictability, and repeated sheltering—are consistent with established patterns of chronic anxiety and developmental harm.[211]

Taken together, the evidentiary record establishes that the Iranian missile and UAV campaign produced not episodic disruption but system-wide paralysis of Israel's educational system, driven by sustained attacks on civilian population centers and compounded by structural vulnerabilities. The consequences are dual: prolonged suspension of in-person education with remote learning as an unequal and empirically deficient substitute, and quantifiable, population-level psychological harm among children, with implications extending to long-term developmental outcomes.

[206]: Keshet Neev, Israeli Schools to Continue in Remote Format Amid War Despite Workplace Reopening, Jerusalem Post (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-889030
[207]: Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, The Consequences of Remote Learning During COVID-19 (2021)
[208]: Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger Woessmann, The Economic Impacts of Learning Losses (OECD 2020)
[209]: Scores Hurt After Iranian Missiles Hit Israeli Desert Towns, Reuters (Mar. 22, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/scores-hurt-after-iranian-missiles-hit-israeli-desert-towns-2026-03-22/
[210]: L. Lipskaya-Velikovsky et al., Mental Health of Adolescents During Times of War, eClinicalMedicine (2025)
[211]: A. Goral et al., Continuous Traumatic Stress in Ongoing Threat Environments, Trauma Care 85 (2022)

Urban Civilian Toll

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, Iranian missile operations produced a sustained pattern of strikes across densely populated Israeli areas, including repeated hits on residential buildings and urban infrastructure, resulting in civilian deaths, mass injuries, and widespread damage.[212] The use of cluster-capable systems further expanded the impact zone, dispersing submunitions across urban areas and increasing civilian exposure beyond discrete strike points.[213]

Taken together, the record reflects consistent, large-scale civilian exposure across multiple population centers. The following graph documents the urban civilian toll resulting from Iranian missile operations between February 28 and April 8, 2026, specifically identifying direct strikes on residential neighborhoods and civilian infrastructure across Israel.



Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images

People take cover on the ground during an incoming missile siren as an interception trail is visible in the background in Beit Shemesh, Israel.

[212]: Scores Hurt After Iranian Missiles Hit Israeli Desert Towns, Reuters (Mar. 22, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/scores-hurt-after-iranian-missiles-hit-israeli-desert-towns-2026-03-22/; *see also* Israeli Military Says Missiles Hit Central Israel, *Reuters* (Mar. 3, 2026)
[213]: Steven Scheer, *Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences*, *Reuters* (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18/; see also How Hard Would It Be to Stop Iran's Missile Threat?, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2026)

Layered Humanitarian and Socio Economic Impact

Health & Fatalities

Between February 28 and April 8, 2026, available data demonstrated a dual-layer civilian harm profile consisting of direct fatalities and injuries from missile impacts alongside a substantial and quantifiable category of secondary medical events. Israeli Ministry of Health reporting indicates approximately 7,100–7,500 total injuries nationwide, with over 100 individuals hospitalized, including patients in serious and critical condition, while 1,473 civilians were evacuated to hospitals within the first week alone, demonstrating the immediate scale of exposure following initial missile barrages.[214]

Magen David Adom (MDA) data indicated over 1,500 cases treated early in the conflict, including both physical injuries and acute stress reactions, with surge periods reaching 199 injuries in a 24-hour window.[215] Total fatalities remained comparatively limited, with approximately 16–31 deaths across the reporting period, and most occurring at or near impact sites.[216]

A significant portion of the injury profile is attributable to secondary mechanisms rather than direct blast effects. Ministry of Health and MDA reporting confirms that many injuries as well as multiple fatalities occurred while civilians were attempting to reach shelters, reflecting the time-constrained conditions imposed by repeated "Red Alert" alerts.[217]

In addition, fragmentation and shrapnel injuries, including those caused by interception debris, accounted for a substantial share of casualties and often occurred outside the primary blast radius, expanding the effective harm reach of each strike.[218] Israeli health authorities also documented anxiety-related and stress-induced medical cases requiring clinical treatment, including acute episodes triggered under sustained alert conditions.[219]

Taken together, the data established that the civilian toll was not limited to direct strike casualties but instead reflects a broader and measurable pattern of secondary harm generated by sustained missile alerts, rapid shelter mobilization, and fragmentation effects across populated areas.

Psychological Warfare

The available data reflect a measurable spike in acute anxiety and elevated PTSD risk across Israel's civilian population during the February 28–April 8, 2026, Iranian missile campaign, even as long-term data remain in development. Israeli Ministry of Health reporting indicates that national mental health demand was already elevated prior to the escalation, with approximately 435,000 individuals receiving treatment in 2025,[220] reflecting a roughly 30% increase from pre-war baselines, while Ministry of Defense data confirm a ~40% rise in PTSD cases since 2023, demonstrating cumulative exposure to sustained conflict conditions.[221]

[214]: Israel Ministry of Health Update, reported in Jerusalem Post (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-888934
[215]: Id.
[216]: How Many People Have Been Killed in the US–Israel War on Iran?, Reuters (Apr. 7, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-people-have-been-killed-us-israel-war-iran-2026-04-07/
[217]: Israel Reports 16 Deaths From Missiles Since Start of War, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 24, 2026)
[218]: Steven Scheer, Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18
[219]: Israel Ministry of Health Update, reported in Jerusalem Post (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-888934; Magen David Adom, Emergency in Israel: Operational Updates (Mar.–Apr. 2026), https://mdauk.org/news/emergency-in-israel-2026
[220] *Health Ministry Wraps Up War Review, Calls for Reforms to Boost Emergency Readiness*, Ynetnews (Jan. 28, 2026), https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjxanwpuwe (detailing the 435,000 clinic intake patients and the corresponding 30% baseline surge)
[221] *Mental Health Evaluation and Escalation Metrics Report*, Israel Ministry of Defense Rehabilitation Department Briefing (Jan. 2026) (documenting the 40% climb in registered PTSD conditions over the 2023–2026 combat baseline).

For the 2026 operational window, Magen David Adom (MDA) and Israeli hospital reporting confirm that acute anxiety and stress reactions constituted a subset of recorded medical responses during missile attacks, including cases requiring clinical treatment and appearing in daily casualty reports alongside physical injuries.[222]

This mechanism of harm is consistent across reporting on the 2026 conflict in Israel. The "Red Alert" system requires civilians to reach shelter within seconds (often 15–30 seconds), producing repeated cycles of acute stress activation, often multiple times per day.[223]

Prior Israeli empirical studies and post-October 7 data show that such environments produce rapid increases in psychological distress, with probable PTSD prevalence rising from approximately 16% to nearly 30% and anxiety/depression rates exceeding 40% following sustained threat exposure.[224] Additional Knesset-linked and clinical reporting indicates that psychological effects extend beyond direct victims, with family-level anxiety rates reported as high as ~80–90% in affected populations, alongside widespread sleep disruption and emotional distress.[225]

While precise long-term PTSD rates specific to the February–April 2026 period remain under study, the available data establish a clear pattern of population-wide acute stress exposure with predictable clinical consequences, including anxiety spikes, trauma responses, and elevated risk of persistent psychological harm under continuous alert conditions.

Economic Disruption

The February 28–April 8, 2026 conflict imposed a measurable and multi-layered economic shock to Israel, driven first by the immediate shutdown of civilian mobility and then by sustained system-wide disruption of economic activity. Beginning February 28, Israel closed its airspace and halted civilian aviation, alongside parallel closures across multiple regional states, effectively shutting down commercial air travel across key corridors.[226]

These restrictions persisted throughout March, with foreign airlines suspending service and Israeli carriers operating under severe government-imposed limits, at times as low as ~5% of normal capacity with strict caps on flights and passengers, and only began to ease in early April following ceasefire conditions after more than a month of disruption.[227] In parallel, Home Front Command restrictions limited movement, closed workplaces and public activity, and constrained economic participation nationwide, contributing to weekly losses exceeding ILS 9 billion during peak restriction periods.[228]

At the same time, the domestic impact was both cumulative and quantifiable across fiscal, infrastructure, and labor industries. Israeli Ministry of Finance data indicate approximately 35 billion shekels (≈$11.5 billion) in direct war-related costs by early April,[229] including 22 billion in defense spending, while growth projections were

[222]: Israel Ministry of Health Data, reported in Jerusalem Post (2025); see also Israel Ministry of Defense Data, reported in Reuters (Jan. 16, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-sees-spike-ptsd-suicide-among-troops-war-persists-2026-01-16/
[223]: Id.
[224]: Israel Defense Forces, Home Front Command, Civil Defense Guidelines (2026)
[225]: Refaeli et al., Post-Traumatic Stress Among Adolescents Following the October 7 Attacks, eClinicalMedicine (2025)
[226]: Knesset Health Committee Discussions, reported in Times of Israel (2026)
[227]: Travel in Chaos as Airlines Cancel Flights After Iran War, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/
[228]: Steven Scheer, Israel's El Al Airlines to Operate at 5% of Capacity After Government Limits Traffic, Reuters (Mar. 23, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-el-al-airlines-reviewing-operations-after-government-limits-traffic-2026-03-23/
[229]: Steven Scheer, Damage to Israeli Economy from Iran War Could Top 9 Billion Shekels a Week, Reuters (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/damage-israeli-economy-iran-war-could-top-29-billion-week-ministry-says-2026-03-04/; *Finance Ministry Reveals Cost of Operation Roaring Lion*, Israel National News (Apr. 12, 2026), https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/425368

revised downward from ~4.8–5% to 3.3–3.8%, and deficit pressures rose above 3.9% of GDP.[230] Property damage data from the Israeli Tax Authority further captures the scale of civilian impact, with 28,237 compensation claims filed nationwide, including 18,408 structural claims for homes, 6,617 for vehicles, and thousands for contents and equipment, alongside thousands of evacuations and steadily rising claims throughout March.[231]

These losses reflect repeated missile strikes on residential and mixed-use urban areas, particularly in central Israel, producing displacement, localized shutdowns, and ongoing reconstruction burdens.[232] These economic effects were compounded by reserve mobilization, reduced workforce participation, and shelter-dependent living conditions, alongside declines in consumer activity and business operations.[233] Taken together, the data reflect not only direct fiscal cost, but a broader and sustained disruption of civilian economic life across mobility, infrastructure, and labor participation.

Olympia De Maismont/Getty Images

A volunteer cleans damages in a flat impacted by an Iranian missile strike in the center of the Israeli coastal city of Tel Aviv, on March 8, 2026. Six people were wounded, some by shrapnel, at blast sites in central Israel on March 8, according to first responders, after the military said it had detected a new wave of Iranian missiles.

[230]: Steven Scheer, Iran War Has Cost Israel $11.5 Billion in Budgetary Expenses, Ministry Says, Reuters (Apr. 12, 2026)
[231]: Nearly 30,000 Property-Damage Claims Filed Since Start of War, Jerusalem Post (Apr. 9, 2026), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-892507
[232]: Buildings, Shops Damaged in Latest Iranian Missile Barrage in Central Israel, Reuters (Mar. 28, 2026)
[233]: Steven Scheer, Damage to Israeli Economy from Iran War Could Top 9 Billion Shekels a Week, Reuters (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/damage-israeli-economy-iran-war-could-top-29-billion-week-ministry-says-2026-03-04/

Institutional Credibility, Accountability Pathways & Legal Redress

Impact on UN Institutional Credibility

Recent appointments of Iranian representatives to multiple United Nations committees and advisory bodies raise significant concerns regarding the consistency and credibility of international accountability mechanisms.

Since the April 2024 Iranian offensive against Israel to date, Iran has faced widespread international condemnation, economic sanctions, and diplomatic censure for indiscriminate attacks, civilian harm, regional destabilization, violations of international humanitarian law, the violent suppression of domestic protest movements, and mass repression directed against its own civilian population.

Despite these ongoing allegations and concurrent scrutiny before multiple U.N. human-rights bodies, Iranian representatives nevertheless obtained multiple leadership positions within several U.N. governance and human-rights-adjacent institutions, including the U.N. Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, the U.N. Commission for Social Development, the U.N. Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations, and the U.N. Committee for Programme and Coordination ("CPC").[234]

The continued elevation of Iran and its representatives into bodies tasked with advancing human rights, international peace, and security, non-violence and institutional governance present a significant institutional contradiction that risks undermining the credibility, coherence, and moral authority of the United Nations accountability framework itself.

In October 2025, Iranian representative Afsaneh Nadipour was appointed to the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee despite simultaneous investigation and scrutiny before the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission concerning repression, arbitrary detention, executions, and the violent suppression of the "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests.[235]

In February 2026, Abbas Tajik was elected Vice-Chair of the U.N. Commission for Social Development, a body responsible for advancing international policy concerning social inclusion and protections for vulnerable populations, despite Iran previously becoming the first state ever removed from the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women following the government's crackdown on women-led demonstrations.[236] That same month, Yahya Aref was elected Vice-Chair of the U.N. Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, a committee directly concerned with international peace and security, sovereignty, and the lawful use of force, while Iran simultaneously faced allegations concerning indiscriminate missile attacks and regional destabilization arising from the 2026 offensive.[237]

[234]: See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on its Thirty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/AC/33/2 (2025); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission for Social Development, Report on the Sixty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/2026/L.1 (2026); U.N. Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, Report of the 2026 Session, U.N. Doc. A/81/33 (2026); Committee for Programme and Coordination, Report on the Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/81/16 (2026).

[235]: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/58/62 (2025); Rep. of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/58/63 (2025).

[236]: G.A. Res. 77/276, Removal of the Islamic Republic of Iran from Membership in the Commission on the Status of Women (Dec. 14, 2022); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission for Social Development, Bureau Members for the Sixty-Fourth Session (2026).

[237]: U.N. Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, Report of the 2026 Session, U.N. Doc. A/81/33 (2026).

In March–April 2026, Iran additionally secured membership and subsequent vice-chair leadership within the U.N. Committee for Programme and Coordination ("CPC"), a principal General Assembly and ECOSOC subsidiary body coordinating U.N. policy implementation concerning human rights, women's rights, terrorism prevention, disarmament, and institutional governance.[238]

The juxtaposition between the mandates of these bodies and the conduct attributed to the Iranian government presents a broader institutional contradiction for the United Nations system. During the same period in which Iranian representatives obtained advisory and leadership positions within committees tasked with promoting international peace, human rights, social protection, and non-violence, Iran continued to face allegations concerning internal repression, mass arrests, executions, violent suppression of civilian protest movements, and support for transnational armed organizations widely designated as terrorist entities by numerous states.[239] These concerns are not confined solely to allegations arising from cross-border military operations against civilian populations in Israel and neighboring states during the 2024 and 2026 offensives, but also extend to the treatment of Iran's own civilian population.

The elevation of Iranian representatives into governance-oriented U.N. bodies despite these concurrent allegations risks undermining the perceived neutrality, moral authority, and institutional credibility of the accountability mechanisms the United Nations is tasked with preserving.

ICC Territorial Jurisdiction via Jordan and Cyprus

The ICC may exercise jurisdiction under Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute where at least one element of the alleged conduct, or its legally relevant effects, occurs on the territory of a State Party.[240]

Jordan (ratified Apr. 11, 2002) and Cyprus (ratified Mar. 7, 2002) provide a viable territorial nexus in this context. The Court's jurisprudence confirms that jurisdiction attaches where cross-border conduct produces effects within a member state's territory.[241]

Transnational strikes resulting in missile debris falling in residential areas of Amman, or violations of Cypriot maritime zones, satisfy this threshold. On that basis, the Prosecutor may initiate a preliminary examination under Article 15, using Jordan and Cyprus as jurisdictional anchors to assess the broader chain of command responsible for the regional offensive.[242] The resulting civilian harm, including socio-economic disruption and sustained psychological impact, forms part of the underlying factual matrix relevant to war crimes analysis.

[238]: Committee for Programme and Coordination, Report on the Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/81/16 (2026).
[239]: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/58/62 (2025); Rep. of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/58/63 (2025); U.S. Dep't of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran (2025); Amnesty Int'l, Iran 2024/25, Amnesty International Report 2024/25 (2025).
[240]: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
[241]: Situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19, Decision on Jurisdiction Under Article 12(2)(a) (Sept. 6, 2018).
[242]: Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15.

Universal Jurisdiction in Germany, France, and Sweden

Universal jurisdiction permits domestic courts to prosecute core international crimes irrespective of territorial or nationality links.[243] Germany's Code of Crimes Against International Law (VStGB) provides for "pure" universal jurisdiction and enables the Federal Public Prosecutor to initiate
structural investigations into conflict-wide conduct, including command responsibility.[244]

France offers a complementary pathway through the constitution de partie civile, allowing victims to trigger judicial investigations notwithstanding prosecutorial discretion.[245] Sweden similarly permits investigation of extraterritorial war crimes, even in the absence of the suspect, subject to procedural requirements at the indictment stage.[246] Together, these regimes provide viable avenues for accountability where direct international jurisdiction may be limited.

Recommendations for UN Special Procedures

The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mai Sato, should incorporate the documented nexus between the regime's external military operations and the intensification of internal repression into her mandate. Formal recognition of how the conflict correlates with increased executions and the contraction of civic space is necessary for a complete human rights assessment.[247]

The Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Farida Shaheed, should address the systemic disruption of schooling across the region resulting from the 2026 conflict, including the erosion of safe access to education under sustained threat conditions. This mandate supports evaluation of widespread educational disruption and, where appropriate, advocacy for a dedicated fact-finding mechanism to investigate the large-scale degradation of educational systems ("scholasticide") within affected areas.[248; 249]

[243]: Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 59 (Feb. 14).
[244]: Code de procédure pénale [C. pr. pén.] art. 85 (Fr.).
[245]: Lag (2014:406) om straff för vissa internationella brott [Act on Criminal Responsibility for Certain International Crimes] (Swed.).
[246]: Human Rights Council Res. S-39/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-39/1 (Jan. 23, 2026)
[247]: Id.
[248]: Farida Shaheed, The right to be safe in education, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/59/41 (2025).
[249]: Farida Shaheed, Right to education in armed conflict: a human rights imperative, U.N. Doc. A/80/479, ¶ 7 (Oct. 15, 2025).

Senior Iranian Government Officials

ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images

Ali Khameini- former Supreme Leader of Iran (deceased)

Hamed JAFARNEJAD / ISNA / AFP via Getty Images

Mojtaba Khameini- new Supreme Leader of Iran

ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images

Mohammad Pakpour- former Commander of the IRGC (deceased)

Miguel Villagran/Getty Images

Ali Larijani- Senior Advisor to the Supreme Leader (deceased)

Attribution of Individual Criminal Responsibility and Legal Redress

The pursuit of individual criminal responsibility must target the entities and commanders who planned and executed the 2026 campaign. The IRGC Aerospace Force maintains operational control over missile and UAV systems through a centralized command structure, supporting attribution at the command level. The systematic nature of the offensive, marked by repeated attacks affecting civilian populations and the use of inherently indiscriminate methods, provides a sufficient basis for international prosecution under established IHL principles.[250] By leveraging the territorial status of Jordan and Cyprus at the ICC, the universal jurisdiction frameworks of Germany, France, and Sweden, and the mandates of relevant U.N. mechanisms, accountability pathways remain both legally viable and operationally actionable.[251; 252]

Brig. Gen. Sayyid Hossein Mousavi Eftekhari has served as the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force since the assassination of his predecessor, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, on June 14, 2025. He previously served as the deputy commander of the IRCG Space Force since 2009. He bears primary command responsibility for the crimes documented in this report.

[250]: Iran Update Special Report, March 23, 2026, Inst. for the Study of War (Mar. 23, 2026).
[251]: Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 133 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
[252]: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; TRIAL International, Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice Briefing Papers: Germany, France, and Sweden (2026)

Conclusion

The evidentiary record from February 28 to April 8, 2026, leaves no room for ambiguity. The IRGC executed a coordinated, state-directed campaign that deliberately subjected civilian populations across multiple sovereign territories to premeditated, severe harm.[253]

The reliance on high-volume ballistic missile fire, widespread UAV integration, and the calculated deployment of cluster-capable munitions in urban centers were not tactical miscalculations; they were structural, calculated violations of international humanitarian law.[254]

Deploying inherently imprecise ballistic systems into city centers obliterates the principle of distinction. Utilizing a saturation strategy designed to exhaust air defenses guarantees civilian casualties, rendering any claimed military advantage wildly incredible. Furthermore, the operational design of this campaign was expressly calculated to inflict sustained psychological trauma and paralyze civilian life, meeting the precise legal threshold for acts intended to spread terror among civilian populations.[255]

The transnational execution of this campaign establishes the jurisdiction required to prosecute it. Missile debris impacting non-belligerent states like Jordan establishes a direct territorial nexus for the International Criminal Court.[256] Simultaneously, domestic courts operating under universal jurisdiction in Germany, France, and Sweden possess the independent authority to indict the architects of this offensive.

The limiting factor is no longer a lack of legal authority, but a deficit of enforcement. If international bodies fail to act on a fully documented, multi-front campaign of indiscriminate fire, they will permanently normalize state-sponsored targeting of civilians and vital infrastructure as a normative feature of warfare between State Parties to the Geneva Conventions.

On the present record, the threshold for action is satisfied.

[253]: *Iran Launches Waves of Missiles at Israel in Major Escalation*, Reuters (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-launches-waves-missiles-israel-major-escalation-2026-02-28/.
[254]: Iran Update Special Report, Inst. for the Study of War & Critical Threats Project (Mar. 2026), https://www.understandingwar.org/; Steven Scheer, Iranian Cluster Missiles Pose Extra Challenge for Israel's Air Defences, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iranian-cluster-missiles-pose-extra-challenge-israels-air-defences-2026-03-18/.
[255]: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 133 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
[256]: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19, Decision on Jurisdiction Under Article 12(2)(a) (Sept. 6, 2018).


מכון ירושלים לצדק
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